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Principal Investments v. Harrison, 132 Nev. Adv. Op. 2 (Jan. 14, 2016)1  
 
CONTRACT LAW:  ARBITRATION WAIVER-BY-LITIGATION   
 
Summary: 
 
The Court held unless the arbitration agreement commits the question to the arbitrator 
with “clear and unmistakable”2 language, a litigation-conduct waiver is presumptively for the 
court to decide because it is a waiver based on active litigation in court. Thus, the district court 
judge in this case did not err in addressing whether the moving party waived its right to arbitrate, 
instead of referring the question to the arbitrator. 
 
Background: 
 
Rapid Cash, a payday loan company, provided loans to named plaintiffs and other 
borrowers.  Because the plaintiffs and others failed to repay their loans, Rapid Cash filed more 
than 16,000 collections actions in Clark County, NV justice court over the course of seven years.  
During that time, Rapid Cash secured thousands of default judgments against plaintiffs and other 
borrowers, using Maurice Carroll, d/b/a On-Scene Mediations as its exclusive process server.  
 
Eventually, the number of same-day receipts and service of process prompted an 
investigation which revealed Carroll and On-Scene Mediations had engaged in “sewer service”-
or falsely swearing that process had been served when it had not. Carroll was criminally 
convicted.   
 
Accordingly, Plaintiffs filed a class action complaint against Rapid Cash, asserting 
multiple claims and damages but disavowing claims for individual tort or consequential 
damages.  In response, Rapid Cash moved to compel arbitration based on its loan agreements, of 
which there were two versions: (1) Dungan/Harrison form; and (2) Quintino form.  The 
Dungan/Harrison arbitration agreement specified that litigating one claim does not waive 
arbitration as to other claims and that either party my elect binding arbitration of any claim.  
However, the Quintino agreement requires a party to submit all claims (with claims defined 
broadly), that those claims undergo mandatory mediation, and if mediation does not resolve the 
issue, parties must then go to binding arbitration.   
 
The district court denied the motion to compel arbitration, holding Rapid Cash waived its 
right to arbitration by bringing the previous collection actions in justice court.  On appeal, the 
question before the Nevada Supreme Court was not only whether Rapid Cash waived its right to 
arbitrate, but also whether the waiver-by-litigation question is the decision of the court or the 
arbitrator. 
 
Discussion: 
 
Arbitration enforcement mirrors contract enforcement. 
                                                        
1  By: Katherine Maher 
2  Ehleiter v. Grapetree Shores, Inc., 482 F.3d 207, 221 (3rd Cir. 2007). 
  Under Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), arbitration agreements “shall be valid, irrevocable, 
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract.”3  Thus, the right to enforce an arbitration agreement can be waived, the same as can 
any contract right under the right circumstances.  However, because of the strong public policy 
favoring arbitration, any doubts should be resolved in favor of upholding arbitration.4   
 
Waiver-by-litigation, as a matter of judicial proceeding, lies within the purview of the court. 
 
The Supreme Court’s guide to labor division under FAA indicates the parties, in their 
contract, have ultimate control over whether the waiver-by-litigation decision rests in the hands 
of the court or the arbitrator.5 If the parties indicate in “clear and unmistakable” language that an 
arbitrator should control a certain matter, such a contract is binding. However, if the arbitration 
agreement is silent on the matter, the labor division is thus:  courts are in charge of deciding 
“gateway questions of arbitrability,”6 while arbitrators are in charge of deciding “procedural 
gateway matters.”7 
 
 There is disagreement amongst the lower courts whether the Supreme Court has deemed 
waiver-by-litigation (a.k.a litigation-conduct waiver) to be a gateway question of arbitrability or 
a procedural gateway matter.  Although the Supreme Court has generally characterized “waiver” 
as procedural gateway question within the purview of the arbitrator8, the majority of lower courts 
have left the litigation-conduct waiver decisions to the court, pointing out that the Supreme Court 
cases arose out of arbitration non-compliance unrelated to judicial proceedings.9  In contrast, 
because litigation-conduct waivers, specifically, involve control of judicial procedures, such 
decisions should rest with the court10—both because judicial power over judicial proceedings 
will comport with the expectations of the contracting parties and also because the court will have 
more expertise in such matters.  
 
 Thus, because litigation-conduct waivers involve determinations about active judicial 
proceedings, the Nevada Supreme Court sided with the majority of lower courts by placing the 
litigation-conduct waiver within the purview of the court, not the arbitrator, unless the parties 
expressly contract otherwise.   
 
The District Court Judge Did not Err in Reviewing Waiver 
  
 Because neither the Dungan/Harrison arbitration form and the Quintino arbitration form 
use  “clear and unmistakable” language to designate the arbitrator as decision-maker for 
                                                        
3  9 U.S.C. § 2 (1947). 
4  Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983). 
5  BG Grp. PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1206-07 (2014). 
6  “[S]uch as ‘whether the parties are bound by a given arbitration clause,’ or ‘whether an arbitration clause in a 
concededly binding contract applies.” Id. at 1206. 
7  “[S]uch as time limits, notice, laches, estoppel, and other conditions precedent to an obligation to arbitrate.” Id. at 
1207. 
8  See, e.g., Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84 (2002); BG Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 1207.  
9  Grigsby & Assocs., Inc. v. M. Sec. Inv., 664 F.3d 1350, 1353 (11th Cir. 2011). 
10  Ehleiter, 482 F.3d at 219.   
litigation-conduct waiver matters, the court presumptively becomes the decision-maker. Thus, 
the district court did not err in reviewing the litigation-conduct waiver matter, rather than 
deferring judgment to an arbiter. 
 
Rapid Cash did waive its rights to arbitration by engaging in collections litigation. 
 
Public policy disfavors arbitration waivers and, thus, they should not be lightly inferred.11 
Waiver of rights requires the following elements: “(1) knowledge of an existing right to compel 
arbitration; (2) acts inconsistent with that existing right; (3) and prejudice to the party opposing 
arbitration resulting from such inconsistent acts.”12 Additionally, “only prior litigation of the 
same legal and factual issues as those the party now wants to arbitrate results in waiver of the 
right to arbitrate.”13 
 
Here, Rapid Cash contends that neither elements (2) nor (3) are fulfilled and the prior 
collections litigation should not waive their right to arbitrate plaintiff’s claims. However, the 
Court concludes, since the litigation does concern the same legal and factual issues as the prior 
litigation, and since the prior litigation was based on fraudulent service of process, Rapid Cash 
did waive its rights to arbitration by initiating that prior litigation. Additionally, the Court 
stresses that this arbitration can be waived even where a no-waiver arbitration clause exists.   
 
Conclusion 
 
Applying the Circuit Courts’ majority view of Howsam and B.G. Group, the Court 
determined (1) an agreement must designate an arbitrator for waiver-by-litigation matters with 
“clear and convincing” language in order to overcome the presumption that (2) waiver-by-
litigation matters are within the purview of the court as they concern judicial proceedings.  The 
Court affirmed the ruling of the district court, holding the district court judge did not err in 
reviewing the waiver and denying Rapid Cash’s motion to compel arbitration. 
                                                        
11  Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Soft Drink & Brewery Workers Union Local 812, 242 F.3d 52, 57 (2nd Cir. 2001).  
12  3 Thomas H. Oehmke, Commercial Arbitration § 50:28, at 28-29 (3d ed. Supp. 2015). 
13  Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Distajo, 107 F.3d 126, 133 (2d Cir. 1997).  
